{"id":19974,"date":"2022-05-10T17:20:50","date_gmt":"2022-05-10T17:20:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/socialmedialab.ca\/web\/?p=19974"},"modified":"2024-12-11T00:49:20","modified_gmt":"2024-12-11T00:49:20","slug":"navigating-the-fog-of-war-during-the-russia-invasion-of-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/socialmedialab.ca\/web\/2022\/05\/10\/navigating-the-fog-of-war-during-the-russia-invasion-of-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Navigating the fog of war during the Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine: An exploratory network analysis of tweets about an alleged chemical attack in Mariupol"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

by Felipe Bonow Soares, Alyssa Saiphoo, Anatoliy Gruzd, Philip Mai<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Misinformation and disinformation about the Russia-Ukraine war are rampant on social media<\/a>, making it difficult to discern between them. As part of our ongoing research on misinformation and disinformation of various types (COVID-19<\/a> related, state-sponsored<\/a>, and those driven by conspiracies theories), we conducted an exploratory analysis of tweets discussing an unverified report that Russian forces engaged in a chemical attack in Mariupol, Ukraine. This claim was made on April 11 by Ukraine’s Azov regiment. At the time when this claim was first reported, Mariupol was surrounded by Russian troops, making it difficult, if not nearly impossible, for journalists to gain access to the city and to interview local sources. We were interested in examining how this claim was discussed on social media because if it was true, it had the potential to galvanize the world\u2019s sentiments in support of Ukraine and against Russia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Method <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Using Twitter\u2019s Academic Track API, we retroactively collected 246,189 public tweets<\/a> posted between April 6 and 13, 2022 to analyze how Twitter users were discussing this claim. We collected tweets related to this case a few days before and after April 11 to capture speculation before the accusation, and the reaction to it. We used the search query \u201cchemical (weapons OR weapon) (Mariupol OR Ukraine)\u201d to collect data. (For data completeness, we kept 12,193 tweets referenced by one of the tweets in the search results.) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

English keywords were used to analyze English posts as previous research that focused on online activism in similar contexts has found that English is more widely used for political mobilization and advocacy at the international level than local languages (Bastos & Mercea, 2015; Altahmazi, 2020<\/a>). Further, Ukrainians likely want to get a reaction from the West when tweeting about the war, so we might expect them to post in English, similar to what we saw during the 2014 Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine (Gruzd et al., 2016<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To examine how information surrounding the chemical weapons claim was shared and reshared on Twitter, we used Social Network Analysis (SNA) to analyze a retweet network. Through retweets, certain claims can be amplified and spread further. Thus, by analyzing a retweet network, we uncovered accounts behind the most popular content in the network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The resulting network visualization is shown in Figure 1 below; each dot (node) is a Twitter account connected by a tie (edge) that denotes an interaction between two or more Twitter accounts in the dataset.<\/p>\n\n\n

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Figure 1<\/strong>. Retweet network on chemical weapons in Mariupol (105,902 nodes and 187,355 edges)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

To guide our examination, we used a community detection<\/a> algorithm to locate densely-connected nodes that tended to reshare the same content with one another. This allowed us to identify the two largest clusters of nodes (depicted in blue and orange in Figure 1). We then used a common SNA metric called in-degree centrality <\/em>to identify influential accounts within the network. In our case, in-degree <\/em>is equal to the number of times an account was retweeted by others in the network.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The following sections summarize our results based on a manual review of the most retweeted accounts (i.e., accounts with an in-degree higher than 500) and the content of their tweets in each cluster. In total, there were 48 accounts in the dataset that met this 500+ in-degree (retweet) threshold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Analysis: Blue cluster<\/h2>\n\n\n
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Figure 2<\/strong>. The most retweeted accounts (Ukrainian journalists and Western media) in the blue cluster<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

In this cluster (Figure 2), the majority of accounts had an in-degree of 4k or lower. However, there were a total of seven accounts that were particularly popular based on the number of times their tweets were retweeted – their in-degrees were between 6k and 21k. Six of these seven most retweeted accounts belonged to local journalists, media organizations, and a blogger\/news aggregator in Ukraine – and one belonged to an academic who studies Russian economy and political system. These accounts, which tended to tweet with an air of urgency and certainty, treated the claim as if the claim is already a verified and established fact. Their tweets called for immediate action to stop Russian hostilities in Mariupol in particular and in Ukraine generally (see Table 1). <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Table 1<\/strong>. Top 7 tweets in the Blue cluster<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Date<\/strong><\/td>Tweet<\/strong><\/td>Poster<\/strong><\/td>User-defined profile description<\/strong> <\/td>In-degree (e.g. number of retweets)<\/strong><\/td><\/tr>
Apr 11, 2022 <\/td>\"Azov<\/td>@KyivIndependent<\/a><\/td>“Independent English-language journalism in Ukraine”
(verified account)<\/td>		20,730<\/td><\/tr>
Apr 11, 2022 <\/td>\"Russia<\/td>@anders_aslund<\/a><\/td>“Economist & author”
(verified account)<\/td>		14,646<\/td><\/tr>
Apr 11, 2022 <\/td>\"Mariupol<\/td>@olgatokariuk<\/a><\/td>Journalist
(verified account)<\/td>		12,123<\/td><\/tr>
Apr 11, 2022 <\/td>\"Defenders<\/td>@lapatina_<\/a><\/td>“Ukrainian journalist”
(verified account)<\/td>		12,008<\/td><\/tr>
Apr 11, 2022 <\/td>\"The<\/td>@IAPonomarenko<\/a><\/td>Journalist
(verified account)<\/td>		10,645<\/td><\/tr>
Apr 11, 2022 <\/td>\"Chemical<\/td>@MelaniePodolyak<\/a><\/td>Blogger<\/td>9,554<\/td><\/tr>
Apr 11, 2022 <\/td>\"\"<\/td>@igorlachen<\/a><\/td>Media Manufacturing Company<\/td>6,080<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

In addition to the prominent Ukrainian accounts described above, we identified a few (less connected) accounts from Western media outlets such as Reuters, The New York Times and The Associated Press in the blue cluster (Figure 2). Most tweets from Western media outlets noted the report of a possible chemical attack, that the report was still an \u201cunverified\u201d claim and that verification was not yet possible. For example, Reuters posted the following tweet:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ukraine is checking unverified information that Russia may have used chemical weapons while besieging the southern Ukrainian port city of Mariupol, Ukraine’s Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Malyar said https:\/\/t.co\/LJgyyQn9ei<\/a><\/p>\u2014 Reuters (@Reuters) April 12, 2022<\/a><\/blockquote>